We study the role of (i) initial dierences in shares of immobile workers between countries, which stand for agglomeration forces, and (ii) positive trade costs in the traditional sector which are related to dispersion forces, in shaping the spatial pattern of the developed and transition countries. We show that on the trade liberalization path in skill-intensive industries, keeping high trade barriers in less skill-intensive sectors is enough to protect a transition country from de-industrialization. If trade liberalization in a skill-intensive sector is accompanied by decreasing trade barriers in the traditional sector, the developed country has a higher probability to become a Core. When partial agglomeration is stable, it is characterized by the Home Market Eect (HME).
Introduction
Empirical evidence suggests that labour markets behave dierently under trade exposure. Thus, US market sectoral trade liberalization with China in 1990s-2000s in less skill-intensive manufacturing sectors (such as apparel, textiles, furniture, leather goods, luggage, rubber and plastic footwear, games and toys, etc.) resulted in shrinking of these sectors (Autor et al., 2013) . However, rising of less skill-intensive industries in China and open trade with Eastern Europe after the fall of the iron curtain had a positive impact on high-skilled industries (automobiles, machinery, electronic and medical equipment) in Germany (Dauth et al., 2014) . Similar evidence is provided by Kovak (2011) based on the path of trade liberalization in Brazil. Hence, the impact of trade liberalization in dierent sectors on agglomeration patterns of developed and transition countries is ambiguous. Therefore, it is a priori unclear which trade policy transition countries should adopt to protect themselves from becoming peripheral regions due to the loss of high-skilled workers. Furthermore, initial dierences between trade partners could play a crucial role in the formation of spatial equilibria and, therefore, should be taken into account.
Hence, the goal of this paper is to address the questions mentioned above by studying the interplay of two eects, i.e. trade costs in the traditional sector preventing agglomeration and asymmetry in immobile workers between countries fostering agglomeration in the bigger country.
To this end, we develop a Core-Periphery model with these two new features. We note that the inverse relationship between the level of education and spatial mobility is well documented in the literature (Notowidigdo, 2010; Bound and Holzer, 2000) . In what follows, within our framework we assume spatial mobility for high-skilled workers employed in an advanced manufacturing industry while less skilled workers employed in a less skill-intensive manufacturing sector are spatially immobile. Hence, we interpret the bigger country, i.e. country with an initial advantage in demand, as a developed country while the country with a demand disadvantage is a transition country. Intuitively, the developed country is more attractive for skilled mobile workers which is guaranteed by its demand advantage. Yet, we study the spatial pattern of developed and transition countries on the path of trade liberalization. In addition, as labour mobility between sectors is costly (Dix-Carneiro, 2014; Artuc et al., 2010), we assume that labour is immobile across sectors.
We summarize our ndings as follows. On the path of trade liberalization in skill-intensive industries between the developed and transition countries, keeping high trade barriers in less skill-intensive sectors is enough to protect a transition country from de-industrialization. In this case countries trade only skill-intensive good and partial agglomeration is stable for arbitrary trade costs in this sector. However, contrary to the symmetric interior equilibrium obtained in Picard and Zeng (2005) , we show that partial agglomeration is characterized by the Home Market Eect (HME) when the country with an initial advantage attracts a disproportionately higher share of high-skilled mobile workers. The question of the presence of HME is not that trivial in a framework where costless trade assumption in the traditional sector is relaxed.
Yet, Davis (1998) sheds some light on the importance of traditional sector trade costs. His ndings show vanishing of HME under costly trade in the traditional sector while trade in this sector does not occur. Contrariwise, Takatsuka and Zeng (2012) within a footloose capital setting show that HME arises for an arbitrary level of trade costs in the traditional sector conditional on the existence of an interior equilibrium with trade in skill-intensive good only.
In this respect, our results for the footloose entrepreneur setting are similar to the footloose capital model by Takatsuka and Zeng (2012) . Comparison of these two frameworks with the Davis' (1998) immobile factor setup leads to the conclusion that factor mobility is enough for HME to overcome the absence of trade in the traditional sector. The economic intuition for this result is as follows. When trade for a skill-intensive good is balanced, mobility of a factor (capital or mobile skilled labour) provides an additional degree of freedom. To be precise, the mobile factor distributes between countries such that it leads to a dierent type of advantage for rms in countries. On one hand, rms in the developed country use increasing returns to scale technology more intensively due to a larger market size regardless of higher production costs in the country. On the other hand, rms in the transition country enjoy lower production costs and softer competition at the domestic market.
If trade liberalization in the skill-intensive sector is accompanied by decreasing trade barriers in the traditional sector, countries engage in trade within both sectors. Trade in the traditional sector leads to instability of partial agglomeration for the intermediate range of skill-intensive sector trade costs while agglomeration emerges in one of the countries. However, the developed country has a higher probability to become a Core since it has a wider range of manufacturing trade costs for agglomeration stability. This conrms that immobile demand belongs to the agglomeration forces. Moreover, under high initial dierences between countries agglomeration in the transition country never happens. Whence, the less developed country could protect their high-skilled intensive sectors by a protectionist policy in other sectors. Hence, the higher probability of agglomeration emerging in some countries than in others may at least partially explain the fact that technologically advanced sectors with increasing returns to scale tend to establish in sparse locations (Fujita and Thisse, 2013) .
Trade liberalization allows shipping a higher fraction of the traditional sector total output, which could be interpreted as an increase in productivity. Murphy et al. (1989) discuss the big push phenomena showing that an advancement in technology gives a rise to economic growth through an increase in individual incomes. Therefore, by analogy, trade liberalization in the traditional sector might be viewed as a source for the spatial big push. Indeed, a decrease in trade costs in less skill-intensive sectors pushes the economy towards agglomeration. In other words, it fosters skill-intensive sector rms to cluster in the bigger market and, therefore, to use increasing returns to scale technology more intensively. Moreover, a big push is more likely for a larger market. This is precisely the case with the spatial big push when higher initial advantage in immobile demand of the developed country allows agglomeration to emerge easily. Last, we study the impact of the countries' initial dierences on the pattern of spatial equilibria. Particularly, we show that the price dierence of the traditional sector good between countries is smaller when countries are quite similar. Therefore, mobile workers are less sensitive to the traditional good price. In addition, smaller asymmetry in immobile demand results in a low-skilled workers wage gap as well as the real wage dierence between countries in both sectors.
Consequently, the smaller the asymmetry between countries, the wider range of manufacturing trade costs guarantees the stability of partial agglomeration. Moreover, interior equilibrium is always a stable spatial structure for similar enough trade partners.
To sum up, we show that the developed country becomes a Core (while the transition country falls behind as a Periphery region) on the path of trade liberalization in skill-intensive sectors only if the latter is accompanied by liberalization in the traditional sectors. On the other hand, high trade costs in the traditional sector guarantee stability of partial agglomeration for arbitrary trade costs in skill-intensive sectors. Therefore, a protectionism policy implemented in traditional sectors by transition countries would be enough to prevent these countries from de-industrialization. In this case, a trade agreement only in advanced-technology sectors may lead to the targeted results -increased high-skilled activity in transition countries due to lower trade barriers instead of outward migration of high-skilled workers. In the opposite way, a freer trade policy for the whole economy forced by policy-makers in developed countries results in concentration of economic activity in these countries at least at some stages of the trade liberalization path.
Literature review. The answers to questions raised in the beginning are hardly given in the existent literature on agglomeration theory for at least two reasons. First, most studies on dierent aspects of new economic geography (Krugman, 1991 Second, the initial dierences between developed and transition countries are underestimated by a widely used assumption of spatially symmetric distribution of less mobile workers. Several studies suggest that the initial dierences in immobile demand between countries have a strong impact on spatial outcome. Thus, Baldwin et al. (2003) explain that the demand generated by immobile residents stands for the agglomeration forces. Indeed, producers gain from being located in a developed country due to closer proximity to a larger share of the immobile demand.
More formally, Sidorov and Zhelobodko (2013) study the`Core-Periphery' model with unequal shares of immobile workers in countries to show that agglomeration in a country with a larger part of the immobile demand is likely to occur. Therefore, it is easier for the developed country to attract mobile workers, eectively pushing transition countries to specialize in less skill-intensive production.
In the sequel, Section 2 presents the model, Section 3 examines the pattern of spatial equilibria and its changes under a decrease in traditional sector trade costs and immobile demand asymmetry while Section 4 concludes.
2
The model Economy involves two countries, Home and Foreign, and two sectors producing a dierentiated good and a homogeneous good, respectively. There are two types of consumers, L M skilled mobile workers supplying inelastically one unit of labour required in the high-skilled manufacturing sector and L A unskilled immobile workers doing the same in the traditional manufacturing sector. Labour is therefore sector specic. Let λ and (1 − λ) stand for the shares of mobile workers in Home and Foreign which are endogeneously determined in equilibrium, whereas ϕ and (1 − ϕ) are exogeneously given shares of low-skilled workers in the countries. For the sake of certainty, we assume that Home is the developed country with the initial advantage in demand, i.e. ϕ > 1/2.
Consumers. All consumers share the same preferences. Consumer utility of type Consumers of type c in country k maximize utility (1) subject to their budget constraint
where p kk i , p lk j , and p k a are prices for a domestically produced variety i, an imported variety j, and the homogeneous good while E k c is the income of c type consumer in country k.
Note that CES preferences allow the aggregation of individual demand of dierent types of agents in the same country. Hence, let x lk i be the aggregate country k demand for variety i produced in country l. Therefore, the rst order condition implies the aggregate demand for variety i:
1 Even though consumers share the same preferences, their consumption bundle could be unequal due to wage gap between mobile and immobile workers.
where E k denes the total income in country k and P k is a price index in k given by
Firms. The traditional sector produces a homogeneous good under a constant returns to scale technology 2 whereas each rm in the dierentiated sector bears a xed cost of F units and a marginal cost of c units of mobile labour. The total production cost is C(q Traditional sector labour in Foreign is chosen as a numeraire, and the corresponding wage is normalized to 1 while Home wage in the homogeneous sector is dened as w A .
As is common in monopolistic competition, each variety of dierentiated good is produced by a single rm and each rm produces one unique variety. We assume a continuum of rms in the skilled labour sector, such that the mass of rms in the sector is large enough to ignore the impact of each rm on the market.
Each dierentiated rm i in country k maximizes its prot given by
Since total cost functions are identical across rms, we may drop index i. The rst order condition of the producer's problem implies the following prot-maximizing prices
Short-run equilibrium. We dene short-run equilibrium as a bundle of per-capita consumptions x ij with corresponding prices p ij , i, j = H, F , masses of rms N H , N and producer's maximization problems as well as balances in labour markets and trade ows, consumer's budget constraints and zero-prot conditions for dierentiated sector rms.
Zero-prot conditions imply that total rm outputs q H and q F are given by
Combining (6) and (7) with the labour market clearing conditions in countries
, we obtain equilibrium masses of rms given by (4)- (5) which take the form
Second, we normalize the xed labour requirement in the dierentiated sector F = µ/σ, therefore, equilibrium rm sizes (6)-(7) are given by
Last, we normalize the masses of two types of consumers L M = µ and L A = 1−µ. Therefore, (8) takes the form
After normalization equilibrium price indices (3) take the following form
Plugging (2) into (6)- (7) we obtain
Using normalization and prot maximization prices (4)- (5) we get
Now we are equipped to study the patterns of long-run spatial equilibria.
Stability of the long-run equilibria
The long-run spatial equilibrium is a situation where none of the mobile workers have any incentives in terms of individual welfare to migrate if none of the other mobile workers move to another country. We dene the real wages of mobile workers ω H and ω F as the ratio of nominal wage w i M to the price index across sectors. Hence, internal spatial equilibrium, i.e. when 0 < λ * < 1 where λ * is the equilibrium share of mobile workers in Home, satises the real wages equalization of the mobile workers between countries. Yet, agglomeration equilibrium is not necessarily characterized by real wages equalization. Indeed, if mobile workers are concentrated in Home, i.e. λ = 1, and ω H > ω F , agglomeration in Home is a stable spatial structure.
However, in both cases the long-run equilibrium is stable when the ratio ω H /ω F decreases with the share λ of mobile workers in Home.
We note that trade in the traditional manufacturing sector does not arise if the relative wage w A in the sector is below trade cost τ A . Intuitively, the higher asymmetry ϕ in the homogeneous sector between countries, the higher the wage gap in this sector between countries, the easier trade in traditional sector arises.
Agglomeration
In this subsection we study the case when agglomeration is stable equilibria. In what follows, we focus on the case of agglomeration in Home, i.e. when λ = 1.
Under agglomeration, trade in the advanced manufacturing sector is unilateral -only Home exports the dierentiated good. For trade balance to hold, trade in the homogeneous sector arises which results in w A = τ A > 1. Therefore, the total incomes of countries are given by
The market clearing condition µw 
Using (9) and (11) the advanced manufacturing price indices (12) take the form
Plugging (15)- (17) into (14), we obtain potential mobile workers wage in Foreign
The relative real wage, therefore, is given by
Now we are equipped to discuss the patterns of agglomeration. Agglomeration in Home Third, we show in Appendix A that behaviour of (18) The pattern of agglomerations in the countries are presented in Figure 1 .
Last, to illustrate our ndings, we run simulations for the µ < (σ − 1)/σ case with the following parameters of the model: µ = 0.4, τ A = 1.1, ϕ = 0.52. The agglomeration in the country with a higher traditional sector (Home) is stable for the advanced manufacturing trade costs belonging to the interval 1.05 < τ M < 1.63 whereas in Foreign agglomeration is stable for 1.10 < τ M < 1.56. As we discussed above, agglomeration in Home is stable for a wider interval of trade costs since it hosts a higher share of immobile workers ϕ = 0.52.
Partial agglomeration
In this section we study stability of the interior equilibrium which is a partial agglomeration due to unequal shares of immobile workers between countries. Under the presence of trade costs in the traditional sector wages in this sector are not equalized between countries. If the dierence in shares of immobile workers in countries is small enough or homogeneous sector trade costs are high enough, trade in this sector does not arise. A higher asymmetry in distribution of immobile workers leads to a deeper wage gap, therefore, trade arises more easily in this sector.
We study cases when (i) the relative wage in the traditional manufacturing sector is smaller than trade costs and trade does not arise and (ii) the relative wage equals to trade costs and trade arises.
Without loss of generality we focus on the case when Home has an initial advantage in immobile workers ϕ > 1/2. Total incomes in countries are given by
Plugging (19)- (20) into the balance at the dierentiated good market
we obtain
M is a relative wage in this sector. Plugging (12) , (19) , (20) , and (21) into (23) we obtain the equation for the relative wage w M as a function of mobile workers share λ:
M . (22) In the following subsections we study in details the two above mentioned cases with and without trade in the traditional manufacturing sector.
Partial agglomeration without trade in the traditional sector
In this subsection we assume that trade costs in the traditional sector are higher than the relative wage in this sector and partial agglomeration is characterized by trade in advanced manufacturing only.
Since traditional sectors in countries are separated, total production in the homogeneous sector in each country is equal to the total consumption in that country, therefore
Plugging (19)- (20) into the last two equations we obtain mobile workers wages in countries
Taking the ratio of (23) and (24), we get the relative wage w M
Plugging (25) into (22), the relationship between relative wage w M and share λ of mobile worker takes the form:
We note that (26) does not directly include the share ϕ of immobile workers and traditional sector trade costs τ A . Moreover, (26) characterizes (up to the normalization we choose) the relative mobile workers wage in equilibrium when τ A = 1 and ϕ = 1/2 (Sidorov and 
The long-run equilibrium is characterized by equal real wage in both countries. This condition is given by
To study the stability of the long-run equilibrium we rst totally dierentiate (26) with respect to the share λ of mobile workers in Home and obtain
since the nominator is positive due to (27).
Equations (23)- (25) imply that the ratio (12) of price indices takes the form
Plugging (25) and (30) into (28), we get the relative real wage as a function of the relative nominal wage
Second, by dierentiating (31) with respect to λ and inserting (29), we obtain
where B is a positive constant.
The µ < (σ − 1)/σ case. In the case when high-skilled manufacturing sector is not too
/dλ < 0, therefore the interior equilibrium is stable for any level of trade costs.
This result is in line with Fujita et al. (1999) who study the CP model with positive trade costs in the traditional sector but equal shares of immobile workers in countries, i.e. ϕ = 1/2. In both cases when ϕ = 1/2 (Fujita et al., 1999) and there is low asymmetry in immobile workers (the current case) trade does not arise which results in the same pattern of dispersion stability.
We conclude that the key point for partial agglomeration stability is the presence of trade in the traditional sector. We show in the next subsection that the partial agglomeration stability pattern changes when trade in the traditional sector emerges.
However, since countries host unequal shares of immobile workers, the equilibrium shares λ * and (1 − λ * ) of mobile workers are not equal in countries. This question is related to what we know as the Home Market Eect (HME) the country with an initial advantage (for example, a higher share ϕ of immobile workers) attracts in the equilibrium a disproportionately higher share of mobile workers making these dierences between countries deeper. On one hand, Davis (1998) concludes that under the presence of high enough trade costs in the traditional sector HME disappears while trade in the traditional sector does not take place. On the other hand, 
.
To study how unequal distribution of immobile workers between countries aects the longrun equilibrium we take the derivative of (33) with respect to ϕ :
The second step is to dierentiate (26) with respect to ϕ
and using (34) we obtain the behaviour of the equilibrium share of mobile workers
It is readily veried that the µ < (σ − 1)/σ condition guarantees that dλ dϕ > 0. Moreover, one can note that dλ dϕ > 1, therefore, the developed country (with a higher share ϕ > 1/2 of immobile workers) attracts a disproportionately higher share λ * > ϕ > 1/2 of mobile workers in equilibrium. Therefore, partial agglomeration is always stable and HME takes place for arbitrary levels of trade costs in the advanced manufacturing sector if trade does not occur in the traditional sector. This result contrasts with Takatsuka and Zeng (2012) who show that interior equilibrium exists only under additional assumptions. However, they observe HME conditional on the existence of the interior equilibrium. In this sense, our results for the footloose entrepreneur setting are similar to the footloose capital setting by Takatsuka and Zeng (2012) . Comparing these two frameworks with the Davis' (1998) immobile factor setup leads to the conclusion that factor mobility is enough for HME to overcome the absence of trade in the traditional sector. The economic intuition for this result is as follows. When trade in the advanced manufacturing sector is balanced, mobility of a factor (capital or mobile skilled labour)
brings an additional degree of freedom. To be precise, the mobile factor distributes between countries such that it leads to a dierent type of advantage for rms in countries. On one hand, rms in the developed country use increasing returns to scale technology more intensively due to a higher market size regardless of the higher production costs in the country. On the other hand, rms in the transition country enjoy lower production costs and softer competition at the domestic market. Simultaneously, balance of the intra-undustry trade pins down wage dierence between countries.
As to mobile workers, HME implies that the relative wage (33) of mobile workers w *
On one hand, mobile workers enjoy a wider range of domestically produced varieties since
On the other hand, they suer from more expensive traditional good in Home due to
Here the former eect always dominates the latter and the developed country always attracts 
Using (25), (30), and (33) it takes the following form
Therefore, immobile workers in the developed country are better-o than those in the transition country and the higher the share ϕ of immobile workers in Home the bigger the gap of their welfare between countries.
The µ > (σ − 1)/σ case. Here we study the stability of partial agglomeration when the advanced manufacturing sector is large enough. First, we note that the nominator in the parenthesis of the (32) increases with trade costs in the high-skilled sector. Moreover, for a high enough value of trade costs it becomes positive since w M ≤ τ
One can note that (26) and (33) do not include µ, therefore, the relative wage w M and Home share λ of mobile workers do not depend on µ in equilibrium. Now it is readily veried that (32) monotonically increases with µ. Moreover, for a low value of µ → (σ − 1)/σ (32) is negative whereas for high values of µ → 1 (32) is positive. This implies that partial agglomeration is unstable for any values of trade costs in advanced manufacturing τ M > τ * M , where τ * M is the threshold value decreasing with the size µ of this sector.
So, when an economy shows a tendency to free trade in advanced manufacturing, i.e., τ M → 1, the (32)
and the partial agglomeration is a stable.
The following Proposition summarizes our ndings.
Proposition 2. Assume positive trade costs in the traditional sector and a higher share of immobile workers in Home (ϕ > 1/2). Then the partial agglomeration without trade in homogeneous good (i) is stable and HME arises in the developed country, i.e. λ * > ϕ > 1/2, when the advanced manufacturing sector is not too large µ < (σ − 1)/σ; (ii) is stable if and only if advanced manufacturing trade costs are below a threshold value τ * M in the case when this sector is large enough, i.e. µ > (σ − 1)/σ.
We summarize our ndings by plotting the pattern of long-run equilibria presented in Figure   1 . Figure 1 corresponds to the case when the high-skilled sector is not too large, µ < (σ − 1)/σ, and the absence of trade in the traditional sector. For the sake of convenience, we omit the unstable equilibria which lie between stable ones. We present the pattern of long-run equilibria in Figure 2 which corresponds to the case when trade in the traditional sector arises and the advanced sector is not too large, µ < (σ − 1)/σ.
Therefore, traditional sector trade acts as an agglomeration force conrming that trade barriers in this sector are an additional force preventing agglomeration. In the next Section we discuss the impact of countries' inequality ϕ in immobile demand and the trade costs τ A in the traditional sector on stability of the long-run equilibria.
Evolution of the spatial equilibria
In this section we discuss how initial inequality of countries ϕ and trade liberalization in traditional sector τ A shape the pattern of spatial equilibria. First, in Section 3.3.1, we look at changes in long-run equilibria under a decrease in initial inequality in immobile demand ϕ.
Second, in Section 3.3.2, we discuss the impact of the traditional sector trade liberalization on spatial equilibria.
Inequality in immobile workers' distribution
We start with the case of high initial inequality of countries in terms of immobile demand, i.e.
ϕ is close to 1. In this case the traditional sector is concentrated in Home. As we discussed in the previous Section, under high enough ϕ trade in the traditional sector is likely to arise and the pattern of spatial equilibria is presented in Figure 2 . Note that, depending on other parameters, agglomeration in Foreign may never be stable.
Now suppose that the initial countries' inequality ϕ monotonically decreases to 1/2. Decrease in ϕ has a dierent impact on the advanced sector trade costs intervals for stability of dierent types of spatial equilibria. First, we study the changes in the interior equilibrium under a decrease in ϕ. It leads to a decreasing interval of (τ To summarize, a decrease in initial inequality shuts down one of the sources of agglomeration forces, namely, trade in the traditional sector. To be precise, a decrease in ϕ decreases the dierence in price of the traditional sector good between countries. This, in turn, makes mobile workers less sensitive to the traditional good price when they choose their location. In addition, smaller asymmetry in immobile demand decreases the mobile workers' wage gap as well as the real wage dierence between countries in both sectors in the short-run. As a consequence, the smaller the asymmetry in the distribution of immobile workers, the wider range of advanced manufacturing trade costs guarantees that partial agglomeration is stable in the long-run. Moreover, for low enough trade costs τ M partial agglomeration is always a stable spatial structure.
Hence, the initial advantage of a country increases the probability of Core formation in this country. However, on the path of trade liberalization in the advanced sector, countries are likely to experience a 'de-industrialization' as we observe this process in developed countries starting in the second half of the 20th century. 
Conclusion
In this paper we studied the joint impact of trade costs in the traditional sector and initial inequality in immobile workers between developed and transition countries shape the spatial pattern of equilibria. We show that a higher share of immobile demand in the developed country results in a higher probability of agglomeration in this country. This conrms the conventional wisdom on the agglomeration nature of immobile demand in the new economic geography models. The Home market eect is one of the manifestations of this nature. However, positive trade costs in the traditional sector decrease the disproportional advantage of developed country to the initial level if trade costs in the traditional sector are high enough (Davis, 1998) .
Therefore, contrary to the trade costs in the advanced sector, which are shown to stand for both agglomeration and dispersion forces (Baldwin et al., 2003) , trade costs in the traditional sector are related to the dispersion forces solely. The higher trade costs in homogeneous sector are, the more likely partial agglomeration is stable and the opposite holds for full agglomeration.
This result is in line with Picard and Zeng (2005) who show that under a linear demand system interior equilibrium is always stable when trade costs in the manufacturing sector are high.
To summarize, in this paper we shed additional light on the nature of dispersion and agglomeration forces in the new economic geography models and discuss the role of costly trade in the traditional sector as well as the asymmetry in distribution of immobile workers on the pattern of long-run spatial equilibria.
